Остром Э. (2011). Управляя общим. Эволюция институтов коллективной деятельности. М.: ИРИСЭН.
Олсон М. (1995). Логика коллективных действий. Общественные блага и теория групп. М.: ФЭИ.
Alesina A., Gennaioli C., Lovo S. (2019). Public goods and ethnic diversity: Evidence from deforestation in Indonesia. Economica, 86(341), 32–66.
Alesina A., La Ferrara E. (2000). Participation in heterogeneous communities. The quarterly journal of economics, 115(3), 847–904.
Allcott H. (2011). Social norms and energy conservation. Journal of public Economics, 95(9–10), 1082–1095.
Bandiera O., Barankay I., Rasul I. (2005). Social preferences and the response to incentives: Evidence from personnel data. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 120(3), 917–962.
Banerjee A., Iyer L., Somanathan R. (2007). Public action for public goods. Handbook of development economics, 4, 3117–3154.
Bardhan P. (2000). Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical analysis of 48 irrigation communities in South India. Economic Development and cultural change, 48(4), 847–865.
Barrios J. M., Benmelech E., Hochberg Y. V., Sapienza P., Zingales L. (2021). Civic capital and social distancing during the Covid-19 pandemic☆. Journal of public economics, 193, 104310.
Campos-Mercade P., Meier A. N., Schneider F. H., Wengström E. (2021). Prosociality predicts health behaviors during the COVID-19 pandemic. Journal of public economics, 195, 104367.
Gerber A. S., Green D. P., Larimer C. W. (2008). Social pressure and voter turnout: Evidence from a large-scale field experiment. American political Science review, 102(1), 33–48.
Granovetter M. (1978). Threshold models of collective behavior. American journal of sociology, 83(6), 1420–1443.
Hallsworth M., List J. A., Metcalfe R. D., Vlaev I. (2017). The behavioralist as tax collector: Using natural field experiments to enhance tax compliance. Journal of public economics, 148, 14–31.
Hendel I., Lach S., Spiegel Y. (2017). Consumers' activism: the cottage cheese boycott. The RAND Journal of Economics, 48(4), 972–1003.
Isaac R. M., Walker J. M. (1988). Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contributions mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103(1), 179–199.
Oliver P. E., Marwell G. (1988). The paradox of group size in collective action: a theory of the critical mass. II. American Sociological Review, 53 (1), 1–8.
Schelling T. C. (1971). Dynamic models of segregation. Journal of mathematical sociology, 1(2), 143–186.
Zhang X. M., Zhu F. (2011). Group size and incentives to contribute: A natural experiment at Chinese Wikipedia. American Economic Review, 101(4), 1601–15.